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Abstract. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform of 2014-2020 is charac-
terized by a strong mandate of Member States regarding the 1st Pillar. This paper’s 
objective is to elucidate the possible impacts of Italian choices on direct payments and 
their coherence with the specific objectives of the CAP, which was established by the 
Expert Group on Monitoring and Evaluating the CAP (EGMEC): food security and 
sustainable food production. Thus, an online survey was disseminated among Ital-
ian CAP experts in the spring of 2015. The results from a sample of 25 respondents 
show that Italian direct payments may positively contribute to viable food production 
by improving agricultural competitiveness. In addition, the combined effect of general 
direct payment schemes and Italian choices is to ensure sustainable food provision or, 
at least, to successfully allow the exploration of this new route in CAP history, which 
most likely represents future challenge for European agriculture.




The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently organized into two pillars, with 
the first being related to direct payments and Common Market Organizations (CMOs) 
and the second being related to rural development policy. Historically, the First Pillar is 
the most important in financial terms, and it currently consumes more than 60% of the 
overall CAP resources (Erjavec et al., 2011; Henke and Coronas, 2011). The current direct 
payments system, which is known as the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), has been rede-
signed by the CAP reform 2014-2020, which has a few similarities to the Swiss scheme 
(European Parliament, 2010).
The debate over the CAP 2014-2020 began several years ago. After an extensive public 
discussion, the European Commission (EC) began an inter-institutional debate by means 
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of the ‘The CAP towards 2020’ report, which defined the challenges that were encountered 
in reform (Greer and Hind, 2012; Swinbank, 2012). In that text, the European Union (EU) 
attempted to respond to new economic, social, environmental, climate-related and tech-
nological challenges by identifying new objectives and new policy instruments that could 
improve the socio-economic conditions of European farmers (Huang et al., 2010). In par-
ticular, analyses on future agriculture developments show an increase in production in 
addition to greater sustainability, which is better known by the slogan “sustainable intensi-
fication” suggested by Buckwell (2014). 
The main result of the inter-institutional debate, which is known as the Trilogue, was 
the increase in national flexibility to implement the CAP (European Parliament, 2015). 
Most importantly, the governments needed to select the optional payments to be activated 
and their annual ceilings. These decisions represented a crucial turning point for orient-
ing the political actions of every Member State (MS) because national flexibility should 
guarantee coherence between the national socio-economic targets and the policy instru-
ments to be improved. It follows that the CAP 2014-2020 could offer an opportunity for 
the creation of a better-targeted policy action due to the First Pillar funds (Erjavec et al., 
2011; Westhoek et al., 2013). 
Because the last CAP reform was characterized by a strong mandate to the MSs to 
manage direct payments, this paper’s objective is to assess whether and how Italian choic-
es concerning the First Pillar are consistent with the following general objectives: food 
security and sustainable food production. It follows that the paper attempts to provide a 
sort of ex ante evaluation of the consistency between the policy objectives of the First Pil-
lar of CAP 2014-2020 and the manner in which it has been implemented in Italy after the 
Government made final decisions regarding direct payments.
Against this backdrop, the following research questions have been addressed in this 
work:
1. Are the Italian decisions on direct payments consistent with the objective to enhance 
food security?
2. Are the Italian decisions on direct payments consistent with the objective to ensure 
sustainable food production?
2. Theoretical and policy framework 
The direct payments system of the CAP provides income support for European farm-
ers. The existence of such payments is justified by the need to provide income stability and 
compensation for higher production standards with regard to consumer protection, ani-
mal welfare and environmental conservation than many non-European countries (Uthes 
et al., 2011).
In recent years, the most relevant innovation in terms of farm income support tools 
has been the introduction of decoupled payments by the EU beginning with the 2003 
Fischler Reform of the CAP (Moro and Sckokai, 2013). This policy change was expected 
to make farmers’ production decisions more market-oriented because their subsidy reve-
nue maximization objectives could become profit-maximizing objectives as well and could 
induce efficient/productive farms to exit unprofitable businesses or reallocate resources to 
other sectors, leading to aggregate productivity gains for the sector as a whole (Kazukaus-
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kas et al., 2010). In sum, the decoupling of subsidies was aimed to reduce the efficiency 
losses associated with coupled subsidies (Kazukauskas et al., 2014).
2.1 A short review of direct payments
Decoupled payments are generally assumed to not distort market outcomes because 
they are considered to be essentially lump sum transfers, which do not produce any mar-
ket distortions (O’Donoghue and Withaker, 2010). If these payments are non-distortion-
ary, a government could use them in domestic policies without affecting either domestic 
or international markets. However, several theoretical avenues exist through which direct 
payments could alter behaviour and, by extension, market outcomes (Kazukauskas et al., 
2014). As a matter of fact, beginning with their introduction, the central research issue 
on decoupled payments has regarded their true non-distorting nature and their impact on 
farm choices (Moro and Sckokai, 2013).
Critics of the decoupled payment system argue that although such payments are not 
directly tied to production requirements, they may continue to have important effects on 
production. Hennessy (1998) asserted that direct payments often have purposes in addi-
tion to income support. In fact, in a very unstable world market, in which prices and 
yields fluctuate considerably from year to year, risk-averse producers may benefit consid-
erably from income stabilization. This income-stabilizing attribute has a corresponding 
insurance effect, which may affect optimal decisions. In addition, there is a wealth effect 
on optimal decisions, namely, that the higher average income that arises from the support 
policy may affect producer decisions. 
Risk attitudes and relaxing farmers’ credit constraints are not the sole means by which 
decoupled instruments may influence production choices (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005). 
Decoupled support may impact the decision to exit the market, which would produce dis-
tortions in the supply. Within this framework, one justification could be that these pay-
ments are taken as rewards for the multifunctional role of agriculture (Moro and Sckokai, 
2013). Moreover, whereas input suppliers usually capture a great part of the coupled sup-
port, decoupled payments are capitalized in land values/rents so that support to actual 
farmers depends on the share of land they own. Consequently, increases in the price of 
land inhibit the conversion of agricultural land to other uses as well as the entrance of 
young farmers into the agricultural sector due to the increased capital outlays required to 
purchase a farm (Patton et al., 2008).
Various studies have shown that the CAP subsidies impact farm sector productivity 
as well. Theoretical studies suggest that subsidies may have a positive impact on farm pro-
duction because they generate a selection process in which the less productive farms exit; 
however, at the same time, they generate a negative impact on farm productivity because 
they distort the production structure of recipient farms, which leads to allocative ineffi-
ciency (Kazukauskas et al., 2010). Nevertheless, for the decoupled subsidies, the link to 
farm activities is weaker; in fact, farms receive CAP decoupled payments irrespective of 
their production decisions. Therefore, the subsidies are less likely to induce allocative and 
technical inefficiency (Rizov et al., 2013). In particular, Kazukauskas et al. (2014) show 
that decoupling policy had positive and significant effects on productivity but that this did 
not lead to high cost product switching behaviour. On the contrary, it incentivized spe-
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cialization in more productive farming activities that are less “painful” for farms in the 
short term (lower requirements of capital, knowledge and technology) and that may pro-
duce positive results sooner.
Certain economists have also argued that expectations of future programme pay-
ments may influence farmers’ current production decisions (O’Donoghue and Whitaker, 
2010). Nevertheless, predictions of the precise nature of long-term changes to the CAP 
are speculative because such changes will largely depend on the division of power between 
reformist and more conservative MSs (Erjavec et al., 2011). For instance, pressure from 
the net contributor MSs to reduce CAP spending has recently increased; therefore, there 
has been considerable pressure for a re-nationalization of the First Pillar, in which all MSs 
would be required to co-finance CAP direct income support from national funds. Con-
currently, in the context of the WTO trade liberalization agenda, the discussion centres 
on the distortionary impact of subsidies on agricultural markets and how the effects differ 
by types of subsidy. Uthes et al. (2011) analysed the impacts of abolishing direct payments 
showing that although rich regions, with a moderate dependence on direct payments and 
either a relatively competitive agricultural sector or a highly diversified sector, will find a 
means to cope with such a relevant policy change, poor regions, with less favourable con-
ditions for agriculture and insufficient marketing, processing and sales structures as well 
as a high dependence on direct payments, will be most severely affected. 
Overall, it must also be noted that the introduction of the decoupling policy coincides 
with a period of relevant increase in uncertainty. Specifically, in the past decade, develop-
ments in world markets, which have led to increasing volatility of global food prices and 
rising food security concerns, have also led to calls for maintaining agricultural support, 
stimulating farm investments and adopting productivity-enhancing modern technologies 
(Rizov et al., 2013). Consequently, the debate on CAP post-2013 has focused on the con-
trast between food security arguments and the provision of environmental services. 
Although the solutions proposed by the so-called “productionist frame” is to maintain 
a strong First Pillar to increase productivity and stimulate public goods provision, propo-
nents of the “environmental frame” argue that the CAP needs to be re-focused and should 
consider both food production and the provision of environmental services as an integral 
part of European agriculture by means of better targeted income support and innovation 
incentives (Candel et al., 2014). It is indeed not surprising that representatives of farmers, 
whose core business is to produce food, deploy the productionist frame and that environ-
mental NGOs primarily use the environmental frame. It follows that the fractured con-
sensus among stakeholders regarding food security and the provision of public goods has 
generated strong disagreement about the appropriate course of action and how a future 
CAP should facilitate such actions. 
Because agricultural and, increasingly, environmental interests are traditionally the 
most dominant interests in European agricultural policy formation, EU institutions have 
attempted to respond to new economic, social, environmental, climate-related and tech-
nological challenges by identifying new objectives and new policy instruments that could 
improve the socio-economic conditions of European farmers (Huang et al., 2010). There-
fore, the need for better targeting of support, which would improve spending quality and 
remunerate farmers for the public goods that they provide, led to an innovative scheme of 
direct payments (Westhoek et al., 2013).
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2.2 The new direct payments: aims and structure 
The CAP 2014-2020 will address a set of challenges, with a few being unique in 
nature and a few being unforeseen, which press the EU to make strategic choices regard-
ing the long-term future of its agriculture; these are: 1) guarantee viable food production 
and 2) promote the sustainable management of natural resources and actions to mitigate 
climate change. Based on these main targets, certain priorities have been acknowledged 
for each pillar. The intervention logic for the First Pillar involves some specific objectives 
that must be achieved by direct payments (EGMEC, 2015):
a. contribute to farm incomes and limit farm income variability in a manner that 
includes minimal trade distortion;
b. improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector and enhance its value share in 
the food chain;
c. maintain market stability;
d. meet consumer expectations;
e. provide public goods;
f. pursue climate change mitigation and adaptation.
The need for improving the effectiveness of the public resources spent requires a clear 
link between policy decisions and CAP targets (Grant, 2010; van Ittersum et al., 2008). 
Obviously, these choices must also be related to the national context and priorities and, 
therefore, should be adopted after a deep analysis of the primary sector’s socio-econom-
ic indicators. Article 110 of the Horizontal Regulation1 proposed the establishment of a 
common monitoring and evaluation framework that includes a set of indicators to meas-
ure the performance of the CAP. Thus, the Expert Group on Monitoring and Evaluating 
the CAP (EGMEC), which assists the EC in the preparation of legislation and in policy 
definition, has provided a set of result indicators. Table 1 shows a selection of indicators 
that are referred to as the First Pillar and that can be used to create an ex ante evaluation 
of the results of national decisions on direct payments schemes (Ciliberti and Frascarelli, 
2013; van Ittersum et al., 2008). 
The new direct payments system will preserve certain features of the current SPS 
(Tranter et al., 2007). Farmers must own or obtain entitlements and possess eligible hec-
tares as well as observe the cross compliance rules. The new scheme is composed of an 
income support component (the basic payment and young farmers’ scheme) and a public 
goods provision component (greening) (Overmars et al., 2013). As shown later, MSs are 
able to activate other optional payments (Table 2). These policy choices determined the 
financial ceilings for each payment because the greening percentage has solely been estab-
lished directly by the EU2.
The basic payment, the greening and young farmers’ scheme must necessarily be 
activated by each MS. The basic payment scheme ceiling is obtained by deducting from 
1 Regulation (EU) no 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the 
financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations 
(EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 
485/2008.
2 Regulation (EU) no 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establish-
ing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricul-
tural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009. 
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the national ceiling the amounts that are utilized for the other (mandatory or optional) 
payments. The payment for agricultural practices that are beneficial for the climate and 
the environment shall receive a fixed percentage, 30%, of the annual ceiling. To receive 
Table 1. First pillar objectives and result indicators. 
General objectives Specific objectives Result indicators
Viable food 
production
Enhance farm income - Share of direct payments in agricultural income- Variability of farm income
Improve agricultural 
competitiveness
- Share of value added for the primary producers in the 
food chain
- Share of exports in world markets
- Share of high value-added products in exports
Maintain market stability
- Commodity price compared with that of the rest of the 
world
- Commodity price volatility
- Commodity price volatility compared with that of the 
rest of the world
Meet consumer 
expectations
- Share of organic area in total UAA







- Share of (permanent) grassland in agricultural land
- Share of arable land
- Share of Ecological Focus Area (EFA) in agricultural 
land
Climate change mitigation 
and adaptation
- Net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agricultural 
soils
Source: 6th meeting of the EGMEC (2015).
Table 2. The architecture of direct payments 2014-2020. 
Payment Mandatory/Optional Financial ceiling
Basic payment scheme Mandatory Residual (68%-18%)
Redistributive payment Optional 30% max
Payment for agricultural practices that 
are beneficial for the climate and the 
environment (greening)
Mandatory 30%
Payment for young farmers Mandatory 2% max
Payment for areas that have natural 
constraints Optional 5% max
Coupled support Optional 13% max + 2% (support protein crops)
Small farmers’ scheme Optional 10% max (sourced from direct payments scheme)
Source: Regulation (EU) 1307/2013.
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this payment, the farmers must implement three standard measures3. The young farmers’ 
scheme shall receive a percentage of the annual national ceiling that is not higher than 
2%; it provides a payment to farmers with specific features. 
With regard to the optional payments, the coupled support scheme could be used 
to maintain levels of production in certain sectors or in certain regions where specific 
types of farming or specific agricultural sectors experience difficulties and are particular-
ly important for economic, social and/or environmental reasons. Because Italy allocated 
more than 5% of its available payment amount to granting the specific supports to Article 
684 for the 2014-2020 period, it may decide to use the maximum percentage (13%) of the 
annual national ceiling. This percentage may be increased by up to 2 percentage points in 
those MSs that decide to support the production of protein crops. Payment for areas that 
have natural constraints could be granted to farmers whose holdings are either fully or 
partly situated in disadvantaged areas, which are designated by MSs. To finance this pay-
ment, a maximum of 5% of the annual national ceiling could be used. The redistributive 
payment could receive up to 30% of the amount that is available for direct payments. If 
Italy adopts this option, no more than the first thirty hectares of each farm will receive a 
supplement, which could attain a maximum of 65% of the average payment per hectare. 
Finally, if introduced, the small farmers’ scheme must replace other direct payments. To 
finance this payment, MSs shall deduct the amounts to which the small farmers would be 
entitled from the other direct payments funds.
2.3 The application of direct payments in Italy 
The Italian budget for direct payments for 2013-2019 totals 27,090 million €, or nearly 
3,800 million € every year. The main national choices of the Italian government are sum-
marized in table 3 and are described in detail below. 
First, to address a number of legal loopholes that have enabled a limited number of 
companies to claim direct payments although their primary business activity is not agri-
cultural, the reform tightened the rule on active farmers.  Italy extended the so-called 
“negative list” to include further business activities that should be excluded from receiv-
ing direct payments (covering airports, railway services, water works, real estate services 
and permanent sports and recreation grounds). In addition, the government established 
criteria to identify active farmers, with flexible requisites for farmers in mountain areas 
and selective conditions for other areas. Regarding the minimum requirement for receiv-
ing direct payments, Italy decided not to grant direct payments to a farmer when the 
total amount of direct payments claimed is less than 250 € (regardless of the farm size) in 
2015-2016 and less than 300 € after 2017. 
3 These include crop diversification (which involved cultivating at least two or three crops, depending on the 
amount of arable land that is owned), permanent grassland (which does not allow farmers to plough the desig-
nated, environmentally sensitive areas), and ecological focus areas (EFAs) (which involves maintaining at least 
5% of arable land that is recognized as an EFA).
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes 
for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amend-
ing Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1782/2003.
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The Italian government decided to apply the so-called Irish model for internal con-
vergence, which is based on the calculation of the Initial Unit Value (IUV). In practice, 
the ‘value’ that is carried forward from 2014 is spread across the ‘number’ of entitlements 
that is allocated to the farmer in 2015. This IUV forms the basis of all subsequent con-
vergence calculations for the value of those entitlements for each year of the scheme. All 
entitlements held under the basic payment scheme are subject to convergence. In simple 
terms, those who hold entitlements with an IUV that is above the basic payment scheme 
national average will observe the value of their entitlements decrease over the five years 
of the scheme, whereas those with entitlements with an IUV that is below 90% of the 
national average will observe the value of their entitlements increase gradually over the 
five years of the scheme. Those who hold entitlements that have an IUV between 90% and 
100% of the national average value will observe no change. In addition to the standard 
level of convergence outlined above, a further test is applied whereby all farmers must 
achieve a minimum entitlement value of 60% of the national average by 2019. If a farmer 
does not reach 60% under standard convergence, then the value of his entitlements will be 
increased in equal increments to ensure that the level is reached by 2019. 
The allocation of national resources across seven components of direct payments 
was as follows (Table 3): the basic payment scheme received 58% of resources, greening 
received 30% of the budget (as established by Reg. 1307/2013), the young farmers’ scheme 
Table 3. Italian choices on direct payments. 
Decision National choice 
Active farmer (exemption threshold to be an active 
farmer) <1250 € for other areas; <5000 € for mountain areas. 
Minimum requirements for receiving direct 
payments 
<250 € direct payments in 2015-2016; <300 € direct 
payments in 2017 
Type of regionalization/model of internal 
convergence National/Irish model
Basic payment scheme 58% of national budget
Redistributive payment No 
Greening (amount of payment) 30% of national budget (calculated as 30% of payment entitlements held by the farmer) 
Areas that have natural constraints No 
Young farmers’
scheme
1% of national budget (value: 25% of the average 
value of payment entitlements)
Coupled support
11% of national budget (of which: 25.1% for beef, 
20.8% for milk, 16.4% for olive oil, 14% for cereals, 
8.3% for protein crops, 5.3% for rice, 4% for sugar 
beet, 3.5 for sheep, 2.6% for industry tomato)
Small farmers scheme (max. payment) Yes (<1,250 €)
Degressivity and Capping (% reduction of direct 
payments) 
50%, if dir. paym.> 150M €; 100%, if dir. 
paym.>500M €; salary costs deducted. 
Source: Our elaboration on European Parliament (2015).
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received 1% of national funds, the coupled payment received 11% of funding and the 
small farmers’ scheme was activated. The redistributive payment and the payment for are-
as with natural constraints were not activated. 
Regarding the greening payment, the amount received by every farmer who imple-
ments the three standard greening measures will be calculated as an annual fixed per-
centage of the value of the entitlements activated by the farmer under the basic payment 
scheme. Regarding the young farmers’ scheme, it is given (for a maximum period of five 
years) to farmers who participate in the basic payment scheme, who are aged no more 
than 40 years in the year when they first submit an application under the basic payment 
scheme and who are establishing an agricultural holding for the first time or establishing 
such a holding during the five years preceding the first submission of the direct payments 
scheme. In Italy, the young farmers’ payment will be calculated as 25% of the value of the 
entitlements activated by the farmer under the basic payment scheme multiplied by the 
number of entitlements activated by the farmer (no more than 90 hectares).
With regard to the voluntary coupled payment, nearly 400 million € are provided 
annually to the livestock, arable lands and the olive oil sectors. In particular, nearly 50% 
of the coupled support budget is allocated to animal production (milk, beef, sheep and 
goat), 35% to arable crops (cereals, protein crops, tomato, sugar beet, and soybean), and 
the remaining funds incentivize olive oil production.  
The small farmers’ scheme establishes that farmers receive an annual payment of 
no more than 1,250 €, regardless of the farm size.  Italy chose a method to calculate the 
annual payment whereby farmers would simply receive the amount they would otherwise 
receive. This method will be a considerable simplification for the farmers concerned and 
for the national administration because participants will be exempted from greening and 
cross-compliance sanctions and controls. 
Finally, in Italy, the amount of direct payments support that an individual farm hold-
ing receives (not including the greening payment) is reduced by 50% for amounts above 
150,000 € (i.e., degressivity) and by 100% for those above 500,000 € (i.e., capping); to con-
sider employment, salary costs are deducted before the calculation is performed.
2.4 Methodology 
The CAP Reform has offered an important opportunity to every MS to better adapt 
economic and financial instruments (direct payments) to their policy targets (Erjavec et al., 
2011). Therefore, national policymakers’ choices on direct payments should be based on 
rational and objective criteria. As previously noted, this article’s objective is to evaluate wheth-
er and how the decision made by the Italian Government may affect the main objectives of 
the CAP 2014-2020. According to this purpose, the following methodology was adopted:
1) a questionnaire was implemented and an on-line survey was disseminated to nearly 
one hundred CAP experts using Soscisurvey software during the spring of 2015; 
2) a 7-point Likert scale was adopted to allow respondents to evaluate the potential 
impacts of Italian choices on direct payments 2014-2020 using appropriate indicators 
established by the Expert Group on Monitoring and Evaluating the CAP (EGMEC, 
2015) for the common monitoring and evaluation framework of the CAP (Ciliberti 
and Frascarelli, 2013);
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3) 25 questionnaires were collected, and descriptive statistics were provided to elucidate 
the possible impacts due to Italian choices for the First Pillar as well as to evaluate 
coherence with CAP specific objectives concerning food security and sustainable food 
production.
The survey was distributed to both academic representatives (professors and research-
ers) and stakeholders (both private and public), who were involved using contacts taken 
from different sources (personal contacts, institutional websites, and scientific papers). 
This choice allowed thorough information and evaluations to be obtained not only from 
the theoretical perspective but also considering the real implications and impacts of the 
Italian direct payments scheme on the primary sector. As shown in Table 4, the response 
rate was 25%, and the respondents are distributed among the different positions/roles with 
the sole exceptions of politicians. The academic world is sufficiently represented by pro-
fessors (28% of the sample); private interests in the agricultural sector (private managers, 
private employers and stakeholders total 40% of the sample) and, to a lesser extent, public 
controllers (8% of the sample) are sufficiently represented as well. Finally, the remaining 
respondents (“others” are 28% of the sample) represent various positions/roles (e.g., con-
sultants, researchers and agronomists).
Table 4. Characteristics of respondents: position/role (n=25). 
Position/role %
Professor 28.0







The low rate of response is not surprising because the issue is also not deeply known 
by the stakeholders, particularly regarding the consistency between decisions and policy 
objectives. The absence of politicians and the scarcity of answers from agricultural pro-
fessional organizations represents a disadvantage. However, this scarcity is because policy 
makers have a lower opinion of completing a survey and most likely do not prefer to pub-
licly evaluate the results of their decisions; these are very often strongly affected by the 
path dependence. In contrast, the fact that more than 50% of respondents are professors 
and researchers may be because, on the one hand, of the complexity of the issue (higher 
for policymakers and stakeholders than for scholars) and on the other hand, of the greater 
propensity to complete an on line survey. Nevertheless, the prevalence of answers from 
the academic world may have certain positive implications for the reliability of the results 
because they, in contrast to politicians, usually are not influenced by conflicts of interests 
and can therefore offer a more objective evaluation of the implications of the national 
choices on direct payments.
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3. Findings and discussion
3.1 Findings
Experts were requested to evaluate Italian choices on direct payments for 2014-2020 
to test the effectiveness and consistency of the CAP First Pillar compared to its specific 
objectives. As previously noted in the conceptual section, the need for viable food pro-
duction and sustainable management of natural resources are the main general objectives 
of CAP reform 2014-2020. These two main goals generate many specific objectives; the 
means by which these latter could be achieved is verified by means of ad hoc result indica-
tors that have been established by the EGMEC. Respondents provided a subjective assess-
ment by means of a 7-point Likert scale based on their own knowledge regarding the new 
direct payments scheme in Italy. Overall, the evaluations provide an interesting picture of 
the possible consequences of the application of direct payments for the Italian primary 
sector as well as highlight certain incongruences between the CAP targets and their appli-
cation in one of the most important primary sectors for the EU-28.
Descriptive statistics of the survey are reported in Table 5. Concerning the first general 
objective (viable food production), four specific objectives were adopted. With regard to 
the purpose of enhancing farm income, respondents criticize the capability of direct pay-
ments to both increase the share of direct payments of agricultural income (mean = 3.2; 
sd = 1.47) and limit the variability of farm income (mean = 3.68; sd = 1.47). In sum, more 
than 60% of respondents believe that the reform of decoupled payments will fail to increase 
farm incomes in Italy. Similar (negative) results concern the ability of the new direct pay-
ments scheme to maintain market stability, although the new Common Market Organiza-
tions also contribute to realizing this objective. In detail, a majority of experts negatively 
evaluate the impacts of the decoupled aid reform on i) stabilizing the prices of Italian agri-
cultural commodities compared with those of the rest of the world (mean = 3.44; sd = 
1.39), ii) limiting the price volatility of Italian agricultural commodities (mean = 3.48; sd = 
1.53) and iii) limiting the price volatility of Italian agricultural commodities compared with 
that of the rest of the world (mean = 3.36; sd = 1.41). In addition, it must be noted that a 
large share of respondents (28% of the sample) claim to “have no knowledge” of such tricky 
issues due to the difficulty of expressing justified and reliable opinions.
As regards the third specific objective, experts very positively assessed the impact of 
Italian choices on improving agricultural competitiveness. In fact, many experts note that 
in the future, the share of high value added products of Italian agricultural exports may 
increase (mean = 4; sd = 1.32), perhaps following and strengthening the current positive 
trend of high-quality Italian foodstuffs exported all over the world. Conversely, regarding 
the impacts of new decoupled payments scheme on i) increasing the percentage of value 
added for primary producers in the food chain (mean = 4; sd = 1.61) and on ii) increasing 
the share of Italian exports in world agricultural markets (mean = 4.04; sd = 1.43), there 
is strong uncertainty (i.e., the share of those who say they “have no knowledge” total 12% 
and 36%, respectively).
Finally, with respect to the aptitude to meet consumer expectations, CAP experts 
evaluate the direct payments reform in Italy very positively. In particular, due to the 
greening payment and the internal convergence of the basic payment that will support 
extensive farming, the new scheme of direct aids could truly enhance high quality produc-
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Increasing the share of direct 
payments in agricultural 
income
76.0 0.0 24.0 3.20 1.47
Limiting variability of farm 




Increasing the percentage 
of value added for primary 
producers in the food chain
44.0 12.0 44.0 4.00 1.61
Increasing the share of Italian 
exports in world agricultural 
markets
28.0 36.0 36.0 4.04 1.43
Increasing the share of high 
value-added products in 
Italian agricultural export
32.0 24.0 44.0 4.00 1.32
Maintain 
market stability
Stabilizing the price of Italian 
agricultural commodities 
compared with that of the 
rest of the world
48.0 28.0 24.0 3.44 1.39
Limiting the price volatility 
of Italian agricultural 
commodities
48.0 28.0 24.0 3.48 1.53
Limiting the price volatility 
of Italian agricultural 
commodities compared with 
that of the rest of the world
52.0 28.0 20.0 3.36 1.41
Meet consumer 
expectations
Increasing the share of 
organic area in total Utilized 
Agricultural Area (UAA)
24.0 16.0 60.0 4.52 1.50
Increasing the share of 
organic livestock in total 
livestock










Increasing the share of 
permanent grassland in 
agricultural land
44.0 24.0 32.0 3.84 1.31
Increasing the share of arable 
land 64.0 16.0 20.0 3.16 1.25
Increasing the share of 
Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) 
in agricultural land




Limiting the greenhouse gas 
emissions from agricultural 
soils
24.0 16.0 60.0 4.36 1.25
1 1 = Very negative; 2 = Fairly negative; 3 = Somewhat negative; 4=Have no knowledge; 5= Somewhat 
positive; 6=Fairly positive; 7= Very positive.
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tion by increasing the share of the organic area among the total utilized agricultural area 
(mean = 4.52; sd = 1.5) as well as by increasing the share of organic livestock among the 
total livestock (mean = 4.32; sd = 1.28). 
The second main general objective of CAP 2014-2020, the sustainable management of 
natural resources and climate action, entails two specific objectives that must be achieved 
according to the EGMEC: provide environmental public goods and foster climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Regarding the first specific objective, on the one hand, the 
CAP experts positively evaluate the manner in which direct payments reform may 
increase the ecological focus areas (mean = 4.56; sd = 1.29) as well as limit the increase 
in the share of intensive arable farming (mean = 3.16; sd = 1.25). On the other hand, the 
experts do not predict a relevant increase of the share of permanent grassland of agricul-
tural land (mean = 3.84; sd = 1.31). 
Finally, with regard to the potential impact of limiting greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural soils, the new decoupled payments scheme was evaluated to be capable of (at 
least) beginning to confront this large challenge (mean = 4.36; sd = 1.25), most likely due 
to the introduction of new direct payments components (e.g., greening) that for the first 
time in CAP history, aims to foster the provision of public goods instead of solely enhanc-
ing production. 
3.2 Discussion
Experts’ evaluations concerning the potential impact of Italian direct payments on 
result indicators established by the EGMEC offer the opportunity to test the consistency 
between the policy decisions and the specific objectives of the First Pillar. The descriptive 
statistics obtained by questionnaires collected in Italy provide interesting results. Although 
it is difficult to isolate and evaluate the effects of the new direct payments scheme in a real 
multifaceted sector, in which, among other things, world market dynamics are increas-
ingly influencing farmers’ outcomes, the results may represent a preliminary test of the 
capacity of the Italian Government to make decisions that are consistent with CAP 2014-
2020 targets to confront the challenges of the 21st century. Considering the results of the 
empirical study, the research questions are discussed below.
Regarding the first research question, the findings highlight that the reform of direct 
payments is not able to enhance (or at least preserve) farm income in a very challenging 
economic framework, in which Italian farmers are now exposed to unpredictable price vol-
atility and global competition. In fact, Italy is subjected to a clear reduction in direct pay-
ments budget (due to external convergence processes aiming to equilibrate the CAP among 
the EU-28) as well as to the internal convergence processes that will determine the decrease 
in direct support received by traditional Italian production (e.g., milk, olive oil, and arable 
crops), whose income strongly depends on direct aid. At the same time, the new direct 
payments regime cannot maintain stability in a turbulent world agricultural market. This 
finding is definitely consistent with the new CAP paradigm, which has progressively shifted 
from a protectionist approach towards a market-oriented approach since the 1990s and in 
which market stability tools have been progressively discarded or at least deeply reshaped.
Moreover, experts assess the decisions on direct payments made by the Italian gov-
ernment as partially suitable to improve agricultural competitiveness. More precisely, 
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whereas there is much uncertainty regarding the capabilities of decoupled aid to foster an 
increasing value-add for primary producers as well as regarding the share of Italian food-
stuffs exports in world markets, evaluators consider Italian choices on the direct payments 
scheme adequate for increasing the share of value-added products in agricultural exports. 
In sum, although all these potential effects are difficult to attribute to new CAP reform on 
decoupled aids alone, the survey shows that this type of support may at least maintain the 
current positive trend of Italian foodstuffs exports in world markets. 
Another interesting topic is the capability of the Italian direct payments scheme to 
meet consumer expectations, namely, to foster farmers’ action or to change their attitudes 
to fulfil market requests. The findings show that the reform of decoupled payments in Ita-
ly may significantly improve the manner in which the agricultural production is able to 
satisfy consumers’ wants due to the incentivisation of both organic farming and livestock, 
which are widely perceived as synonymous with high quality and safe production.
To summarize, the findings highlight that the new direct payments scheme is not able 
to directly enhance farm income or protect farmers from world market turbulence due to 
the external and internal convergence processes and the ongoing dismantling of old mar-
ket policies. At the same time, new decoupled aids could positively contribute to viable 
food production by improving the agricultural competitiveness of Italian farms, supporting 
increasing exports of high value-added foodstuffs on the one hand and fulfilling consumer 
expectations (for instance, through high quality organic farming) on the other hand. These 
results confirm that in accordance with European trends, the implementation of direct pay-
ments in Italy no longer strives to directly support farm income, but seeks to foster Italian 
farm competitiveness to make them able to confront world market challenges.
Furthermore, because certain key targets of the CAP 2014-2020 reform process 
were the provision of public goods and the sustainable management of agro-ecosystems, 
experts were also requested to assess the potential effects of the new Italian direct pay-
ments scheme on these issues. Therefore, with regard to the second research question, the 
evaluations appear to reveal that Italy could succeed in containing intensive crop farm-
ing and increasing the share of ecological areas in utilized agricultural areas. These results 
may be due to the introduction of the greening payment on the one hand and to the com-
bined effect of the internal convergence (that finally fosters extensive farming) and the 
decision to assign a relevant portion of coupled support to mountain livestock on the oth-
er hand. Overall, primarily for the same reasons previously noted, the application of direct 
payments in Italy may help limit greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural soils. In sum, 
the findings show that Italian choices for direct payments are capable of ensuring sustain-
able food provision or at least positively exploring this new route along the old CAP histo-
ry, which is smartly summarized by the slogan “public money for public goods,” and that 
which may represent the serious future challenges for European agriculture beyond 2020.
4. Conclusions
CAP reform 2014-2020 entails a deep revision of direct payments. In a general eco-
nomic, financial and policy framework where public funds represent scarce resourc-
es, European institutions and MSs must carefully manage such a relevant policy, which 
involves millions of farmers across the EU-28. To realize a reform that is more targeted to 
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recipients and to foster effective public spending, for the first time in CAP history, each 
MS received a strong mandate to manage the First Pillar. Obviously, this new approach 
involves Italy, where policymakers are strongly involved in making relevant decisions con-
cerning the new direct payments scheme.
This paper offered a sort of ex ante evaluation of the ability of these Italian choices 
of direct payments to match the general and specific objectives of the CAP 2014-2020 
reform. The EGMEC result indicators allow experts to assess whether and how newly 
decoupled support helps Italian agriculture achieve these targets. Although, on the one 
hand, the survey mainly involved scholars rather than politicians or agricultural profes-
sional organizations and, on the other hand, such an evaluation may be tricky and generic 
because it is usually very difficult to separate and clearly distinguish the effects of policy 
implementation from the impacts of markets dynamics, the findings show a discrete abili-
ty of the new Italian direct payments scheme to pursue the CAP-specific objectives, main-
ly ensuring viable food production and fostering the sustainable management of natural 
resources. 
Findings (reported in Table 5) have shown that the evaluators considered that direct 
payment reform 2014-2020 will have specific impacts in Italy, which are described below:
1) a slight but negative effect on farm incomes caused by both the decrease in the 
Italian budget for direct payment and the regionalization of direct aids; however, such 
negative effects are counterbalanced by the so-called “Irish model” of internal conver-
gence that may lessen the economic shock due to the redistribution of payments across 
farms and regions;
2) an improvement in farm competitiveness, increasingly influenced by a strong lib-
eral and market-oriented approach and by peculiarities of the Italian reform of direct pay-
ment (e.g., the “Irish model”, coupled supports). Consequently, Italian farms will need to 
rely on their main strengths (e.g., high-quality and high value-added products) instead of 
on direct aids to acquire a strong position in a competitive world market, enhance their 
incomes and indirectly contribute to viable food production;
3) no enhancement of global agricultural market stability because direct payments are 
not allocated to regulate market functioning, in contrast to the Common Market Organi-
zation (Reg.EU 1308/2013), which is properly devoted to such an issue;
4) a positive impact on the agro-ecosystem due to the increased ecological area and 
a decrease in greenhouse gas emission; in particular, Italian choices have not significantly 
modified the “environmentally friendly” approach of the direct payment reform to con-
vince the CAP experts that such environmental goals will be achieved. 
In conclusion, the evaluation of the impact of Italian choices on the EGMEC result 
indicators allowed the experts to emphasize that on the one hand, direct aid may con-
tribute to improving agricultural competitiveness and fulfilling consumer expectations, 
whereas on the other hand, there are certain specific objectives that may not be achieved, 
e.g., the enhancement of farm incomes and the maintenance of market stability. Further-
more, the introduction of greening payments represents a very important innovation in 
the CAP; this manages to reinforce environmentally friendly practices in the primary sec-
tor or at least to begin diffusing the sustainable management of natural resources in Italy, 
to foster the provision of public goods and mitigate climate change by 2020.
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